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FINDING CREATIVITY IN 
THE DIVERSITY OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 
Johan Hattingh 
The contribution is a comprehensive if abbreviated review of different philosophical perspectives on 
human-environment relationships. Extensively referenced, it outlines historical trends and current debates 
in the field of environmental ethics. The author argues that the diversity and disagreements amongst envi-
ronmental philosophers is not a cause for concern, but rather an opening in which new and better positions 
can be sought, towards a philosophy which can meaningfully enable environmental practice. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the first thirty years or so of its existence as an 
academic discipline, environmental ethics occu-
pied itself mainly with the articulation of value 
theories that could underpin the practical agenda of 
environmentalism. Its aim was to develop appro-
priate concepts and methods to discuss our envi-
ronmental concerns and our policy responses to it. 
It attempted to establish a rational basis on which 
we could distinguish environmentally sound from 
environmentally unsound forms of production and 
consumption, lifestyles, courses of action and poli-
cies. It also made proposals about principles, 
strategies and structures of decision-making that 
would enable us to balance concerns about envi-
ronmental degradation with human interests in 
things like jobs, housing and survival. And above 
all, it tried to do this without being unfair to pre-
sent as well as future generations or compromising 
what we know today as freedom and human digni-
ty. 
Besides its practical focus, environmental ethics as 
an academic discipline is characterised by a vast 
array of theoretical positions that have crystallised 
during the course of its history. Many of these 
positions significantly overlap, but there are also 
deep-seated differences. Because of the intensity 
and abstraction of the philosophical debate 
between them it often seems as if the practical 
intent of environmental ethics is obscured by its 
bent to determine what is philosophically support-
able and what is not (Hargrove, 1989:ix). 
In this article', I would like to focus on this diver-
sity in the various positions that can be found in 
environmental ethics. My aim is to give an 
overview of these differences and more important-
ly to comment on the meaning of this diversity. 
This could be achieved by defending the following 
thesis: 
environmemal ethics has not succeeded in devel-
oping a value the01y, in the form of a single 
cohere/If doctrine, profound enough to support the 
practical concerns of environmentalism, and is 
unlikely to develop one in the near future. This is 
no cause for despair: such diversity should be 
understood as a characteristic of the historical 
phase within which environmental ethics finds 
itself, and as a rich source of creativity' from 
which to draw when we conceptua/ise w:d respond 
to enviromnental problems. 
The diversity in the theoretical positions in envi-
ronmental ethics can help us to better and more 
creatively provide answers to the key questions 
that form the core components of any practical 
effort to conceptualise or respond to environmen-
tal problems. These questions are (Stone, 
1988:140-142): 
* What is the objective of our environmental 
concern? 
* What is the foundation of our environmental 
concern? 
* What are the objects of our environmental 
concern, in contra-distinction to the things 
about which we are not concerned? 
* What are the concrete actions, duties and 
obligations into which our concern should 
be translated? 
* What should we do in the case of conflicting 
indications? 
It is an impossible task, however, to give a com-
prehensive overview of what went on in a lively 
and vibrant academic field in over thirty years so I 
will concentrate on broad trends and provide the 
interested reader with references for further read-
ing to avoid the risk of caricaturising the positions. 
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A SHORT HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS' 
Whilst the intellectual climate for environmental 
ethics as an academic discipline was prepared dur-
ing the last years of the sixties, environmental 
ethics only became known under this name during 
the seventies. Tbe •erm 'environmental ethics' is a 
misnomer. The philosophical thinking practised 
under this umbrella focuses on ethical principles 
but also on aesthetics, metaphysics, epistemology, 
philosophy of science, and social and political phi-
losophy in so far as they contribute to a better 
understanding of environmental problems and our 
responses to them (Hargrove, 1989:2,3). 
!973 was to be a landmark year. At the 15th World 
Conference of Philosophy Australian philosopher 
Richard Routley presented a paper with the title "Is 
there a need for a new, an environmental, ethic?"In 
the same year, Arne Naess, a Norwegian philoso-
pher, published the influential essay "The shallow 
and the deep, long-range ecology movement", in 
Inquiry, inaugurating what became known as the 
deep ecology movement'. 
In 1974 John Passmore, a noted social and politi-
cal philosopher published a book in reaction to 
Routley entitled Man's Responsibility for Nature: 
Ecological Problems and Western Traditions. He 
argued that there is no need for a separate ethical 
field of environmental ethics. He suggested that 
environmental philosophy was inconsistent not 
only with Western philosophy, but also with the 
Western tradition (Hargrove 1989:3). Until the mid 
SO's, most of the philosophical debate focused on 
a refutation of Passmore's claims. The most com-
prehensive challenge to Passmore from this era can 
be found in Robin Attfield's book on The Ethics of 
Environmental Concern that was published in 
!983. 
In the 1970s environmental ethics was an emerg-
ing sub-discipline of applied ethics and was treat-
ed for the most part as a curiosity. Mainstream phi-
losophy journals rarely published more than one 
token article per year (Hargrove, 1998:339). 
Holmes Rolston's article in Ethics in 1975 entitled 
"Is there an ecological ethic?" brought the exis-
tence of environmental ethics prominently to the 
attention of mainstream philosophy. Until the late 
seventies Inquiry was the primary philosophy jour-
nal that dealt with environmental ethics. 
This situation changed when Eugene Hargrove 
founded a refereed journal, Environmental Ethics, 
in 1979. Two issues dominated the first five years 
of this journal: the notion of the rights of nature as 
a foundational basis for environmental ethics and 
the question of the relationship between environ-
mental ethics and animal rights/animal liberation. 
The notion of the rights of nature was finally dis-
missed as a foundation. It was seen as indefensible 
on philosophical grounds. Animal welfare ethics 
became a special field with its own journals'. 
During the second half of the 80s and into the 90s, 
Environmental Ethics carried a wide variety of 
articles from different points of view'. The debate 
about a philosophically sound foundation for envi-
ronmental ethics still continues and as yet no sin-
gle proposal has found general support. Today the 
debate centres on the question of whether we 
should be looking for a single foundation support-
ing a coherent and internally consistent environ-
mental ethic (the position of moral monism), or 
rather accept a plurality of different principles (the 
position of moral pluralism). 
Within the foundation debate philosophers are also 
still arguing about whether our moral concern for 
the environment should be founded on the notion 
of the intrinsic (or inherent) value of nature. 
Philosophers seem to fall in two broad camps 
namely the non-anthropocentrist intrinsic value 
theorists and the anthropocentrist instrumental 
value theorists. Although there are different 
emphases placed within each grouping, the former 
denies and the latter affirms that nature only has 
value in so far as it can be utilised by humans for 
various purposes, including non-consumptive uses 
like aesthetic enjoyment. 
Within each one of these groupings, however, 
there exists another division. The anthropocentrist, 
instrumental value theorists argue over the adop-
tion of a strong or a weak anthropocentrist posi-
tion. Among the non-anthropocentric, intrinsic 
value theorists, it is argued whether the intrinsic 
value of nature is objective or subjective. Although 
they differ on many points, Paul Taylor and 
Holmes Rolston, for instance, argue for an objec-
tivist position, while Callicott contends that value 
cannot exist in nature without a self-conscious 
human doing the valuing. According to Callicott's 
view, the intrinsic value of nature is not inherent in 
nature, but ascribed subjectively to nature by 
humans. 
The philosophical contributions to Environmemal 
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Ethics during the 80s and 90s have also been dom-
inated by two other themes that cut across the divi-
sions mentioned. A substantial number of articles 
attempted to articulate the ethical meaning of an 
emerging consciousness that humans in many 
respects, if not all, are part of nature. This led to 
articulations of ethical positions in which concepts 
such as relationships, community, systems, loca-
tion, context, place, time, and finitude play a cen-
tral role. An overwhelming number of contribu-
tions were also devoted to an explication of princi-
ples and decision-making criteria that could be 
used in the practical context of conservation, envi-
ronmental policy formulation, regulation and man-
agement. 
After the tentative beginnings of environmental 
ethics during the 70s and early 80s, a number of 
important books were published towards the end of 
the eighties. Following Robin Attfield's The Ethics 
of Environmental Concern (1983), Charles Birch 
and John B. Cobb, Jr.'s The Liberation of Life: 
From Cell to the Community 7 (1981) and the 
anthology of papers Ethics and the Environment 
(1983), edited by Donald Schrerer and Tom Attig, 
philosophers such as Paul Taylor (Respect for 
Nature, 1986), Holmes Rolston (Philosophy Gone 
Wild, 1986) and (Environmental Ethics, 1988), 
Mark Sagoff (The Economy of the Earth, 1988), 
Eugene Hargrove (Foundations of Environmental 
Ethics, 1989), Baird Callicott (In Defence of the 
Land Ethic 1989), Bryan Norton (Why Preserve 
Natural Diversity?, 1987)', Kristin Shrader-
Frechette and many others contributed substan-
tively to the theoretical debates (Hargrove, 1998: 
340). 
The 90s saw the establishment of two more refer-
eed journals and two societies. The UK-based 
Environmental Values was founded in 1992 by 
Alan Holland, while Ethics and the Environment, 
edited by Victoria Davion, was established in 
1995. The International Society for Environmental 
Ethics was founded in 1990 by Holmes Rolston 
and Laura Westra. It now has members on all con-
tinents of the world. In 1998 Bruce V. Foltz and 
Robert Frodeman started the International 
Association for Environmental Philosophy: a phe-
nomenological alternative to the !SEE (Hargrove, 
1998:340). 
Ecofeminism, social ecology, and bioregionalism 
also emerged as distinct environmental ethics 
movements during the 80s. Ecofeminism encom-
passes a number of feminist positions, and its most 
important exponents are Val Plumwood and Karen 
Warren. Social ecology is based on the work of 
Murray Bookchin, while bioregionalism is pre-
dominantly based on the work of Kirkpatrick Sale. 
Taken together with deep ecology, these move-
ments could be classified as radical in so far as 
they share the assumption that mainstream envi-
ronmenwlism and environmeP'21 ethics only pro-
vide a superficial understanding of the causes and 
structure of our environmental problems, and 
therefore respond in a wholly inadequate manner. 
Instead of slight reformations of our values, pref-
erences, practices and institutions, these radical 
positions would rather call for a complete transfor-
mation, not only of our consciousness, but also of 
our behaviour and societal structures. What 
requires transformation are our narrow notions of 
self-realisation, patriarchy, dualistic thinking pat-
terns, international trade relations and alienation 
from the very region within which we live. In short 
all forms of domination, exploitation and rootless-
ness. Important links between radical environmen-
talism and environmental ethics were established 
when the Canadian based deep ecology journal 
The Trumpeter, edited by Alan Drengson, was 
founded in 1983. Earth Ethics Quarterly, estab-
lished in 1989, is now the mouthpiece of the 
Centre for Life and Environment which focuses on 
sustainable development. 
The history of environmental ethics then displays 
at least three important features: 
I. It is characterised by a movement, from very 
tentative beginnings and the question of whether a 
terrain such as environmental ethics existed at all, 
to a well established and widely recognised acade-
mic field. 
2. It is characterised by a tension between philo-
sophical and practical impulses, with the latter dri-
ving philosophers to be of practical use in the 
diverse fields of environmental decision-making 
and policy formulation. The challenge of course is 
to maintain a healthy balance but we need to 
acknowledge that many philosophers apparently 
are not very successful in doing so. In fact, it could 
be maintained that the technical philosophical 
impulse has been dominating environmental ethics 
from its inception to the detriment of the practical 
impulse. After all, the journal Environmelllal 
Values was created in part precisely because 
Environmental Ethics was not very successful 
when it came to influencing environmental deci-
sion-making, policy formulation and education. 
The same reasons led to the establishment of the 
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International Association of Environmental 
Philosophy as an alternative to the International 
Society for Environmental Ethics (Hargrove, 
1998:340). 
3. The short history of environmental ethics has 
been a process of increasing diversification. From 
this brief overview above it is evident that envi-
ronmental ethics does not speak with a single, 
coherent and internally consistent voice. It never 
has and it seems unlikely that it ever will. Instead 
the intense internal debates among environmental 
philosophers contribute to the popular image that 
philosophers tend to talk to themselves, turning 
their backs on a world which hopes to gain from 
the insights they can bring to decision-making 
strategies used in environmental policy formula-
tion and management. 
This predicament begs the question whether we 
should not rather ignore environmental ethics. I 
submit that we should postpone an answer until we 
have confronted the full force of this conclusion in 
a systematic analysis of the different positions in 
environmental ethics. 
A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO DIFFERENT 
POSITIONS IN ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 
From a systematic point of view, environmental 
ethics positions should be seen as loosely integrat-
ed sets of values and principles used by people in 
a variety of contexts to make environmental deci-
sions or formulate environmental policies in 
everyday life. These sets of values and principles 
are often not explicitly articulated or consciously 
supported by people, and rather form part of the 
world views they live by. Part of the task of 
philosophers is to articulate and clarify these sets 
of values and principles, as well as the assump-
tions informing them and their implications. For 
the purposes of my overview I would like to sug-
gest a systematic six-way split between different 
environmental ethics positions: ruthless develop-
ment; resource conservation; wilderness preserva-
tion; extensionism; ecological sensibility; and rad-
ical environmentalism. 
My description of these positions will be general 
but with enough detail to demonstrate that it is not 
only within academia that environmental ethics is 
fragmented, disjointed and internally incoherent, 
but also within environmentalism itself. I shall 
argue later how both the academic field of envi-
ronmental ethics and environmental practitioners 
can benefit from this diversity and plurality of 
positions. 
The 'Ethical' Position of the Ruthless 
Developer 
The ethical position of the ruthless developer, who 
seeks to maximally exploit and develop the natur-
al resources of the earth, can only be seen as an 
ethical position from a technical point of view. It 
entails a framework within which certain goals for 
resource utilisation are articulated, together with 
notions justifying it and gives us details about the 
things we should take responsibility for, as well as 
how to do it and what to do when interests clash. 
From the point of view of environmentalists, how-
ever, this position is patently unethical and consti-
tutes to a large extent the main target of their criti-
cism. 
From a technical point of view, the 'ethical' posi-
tion of the ruthless developer can be characterised 
as extremely anthropocentric. The non-human 
world is valuable only in terms of instrumental 
value (Fox, 1995:149). From a practical point of 
view, the 'ethical' position of the ruthless develop-
er supports an unrestrained exploitation and 
expansion of natural resources. This can be further 
explained in the following points (Fox, 1995:152-
153): 
* The physical transformation value of the non-
human world: what is emphasised is the value that 
humans can acquire by physically transforming the 
non-human world, for example, by farming, 
damming, pulping, and slaughtering. 
* Growth and Progress: the physical transforma-
tion value of the non-human world is not only 
measured in terms of economic value, but equated 
with economic growth which is seen as progress. 
* The myth of superabundance: in order to justify 
the continuous expansion of resource exploitation, 
this approach relies on the myth that there is 
always 'more where that came from'. Shrader-
Frechette (1981:31-44) has referred to this as 
'cowboy' or 'frontier ethics': if we have exhaust-
ed the resources in one place, we move on. 
* Short term thinking: its anthropocentrism does 
not extend to include consideration of the interests 
of future generations of humans. Callous as this 
may seem, it is consistent with the radical anthro-
pocentric position adopted here, which argues that 
we can safely afford to ignore the problems of 
future generations, since the capacity of human 
ingenuity to meet these problems as they arise, is 
infinite. 
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* Technological optimism: The faith in the power 
of the human mind ties in with the belief that sci-
ence and technology will always deliver us from 
all possible harm caused by our continued unre-
strained exploitation and expansion of resources. 
Here is an approach that has much, if not every-
thing. to do with the current environmental prob-
lems we are facing. As such it can hardly be seen 
as an ethical position that deserves any support. 
People with even the slightest concern about the 
exhaustion of our resources and the interests of 
future generations would move away from the 
arrogant selfishness of this position. 
Resource Conservation and Development 
Resource conservation and development can be 
characterised as anthropocentric with a slight bent 
to moderation. The focus here is still on the value 
that humans can gain from the physical transfor-
mation of resources, but it at least recognises that 
there are limits to material growth: there is not 
always more where something came from (Fox, 
1995: 153). Furthermore, it has a longer-term focus 
than the unrestrained exploitation and expansion 
approach. This follows from the acknowledgement 
that there are limits to growth, and is informed by 
the humanitarian (Kantian) ideals of respecting the 
freedom and dignity of every person and serving 
the well-being of all humans. This implies concern 
about the interests of fellow and future humans 
when we decide upon courses of action (Fox, 
1995:153). 
This approach is further characterised by a strong 
aversion to wasting resources, which is considered 
sinful. There are two ways to waste: inefficient 
use, or failing to use potential resources when they 
are available, for example taming a wild river to 
generate electricity (Fox, 1991:154). In accor-
dance with its anthropocentric point of departure 
resource conservation also embraces science and 
utilitarian cost-benefit analyses to guide us in find-
ing optimum levels of resource utilisation'. Such 
concerns are expressed in phrases like 'wise use' 
or 'maximum sustainable yield'. 
In the history of American environmentalism 
Gifford Pinchot adopted this conservationist posi-
tion. Standing midway between unlimited 
exploitation and absolute protection, Pinchot sup-
ported rational planning and development of 
resources for maximum sustainable yield that 
would conserve resources for future generations. 
This view was carried over to most of the new 
breed of professional foresters that Pinchot devel-
oped during his lifetime. Consistent with its utili-
tarian calculus, however, this lead to the opening 
of federal land for mining, grazing and lumber 
companies in areas that many environmentalists 
would have preferred left untouched. 
Aldo Leopold started his career in forestry within 
the conservationist framework made available by 
Pinchot. Later in his life, however, Leopold 
severely criticised this approach. In a revealing 
essay entitled "Thinking like a Mountain" 
(1991:137-140) Leopold reflected on the part he 
had played in a predator eradication program in the 
Rockies, the purpose of which was to get rid of all 
the wolves and mountain lions in order to increase 
the number of deer that could be harvested during 
the hunting season. The idea was that the hunters 
took over the ecological function of controlling the 
deer population. It was only after they had shot the 
last mountain lion and experienced first the devas-
tation of the mountainside by a runaway deer pop-
ulation and then the subsequent crash of the deer 
population itself, that Leopold realised how 
wrong-headed their scientific management pro-
gram was. He came to the insight that only a 
mountain has lived long enough to listen objec-
tively to the howl of the wolf. 
The point of Leopold's metaphor was that the sci-
ence used in their management plan was grossly 
inadequate. Leopold suggested that they had used 
a mechanistic model of science that can only be 
applied with success to static systems with inter-
changeable parts. The 'atom of management' 
selected was the predators, and the idea was to 
replace it with another part which could fulfil its 
functions, namely 'hunters'. This in itself proved 
to be a disastrous choice. Leopold contended that 
they were also mistaken in misreading the nature 
of the ecological system of the mountain, seeing it 
as a mechanism, whose behaviour could be pre-
dicted and managed on the basis of certain, regular 
patterns. They only thought in terms of maximis-
ing benefits to humans in the short term. The 
mountain 'thought' in terms of ecological and geo-
logical time: the time it took to evolve plants and 
animals and behaviour patterns appropriate to the 
conditions of the mountain slopes, and the time it 
will take for a devastated mountain vegetation to 
regenerate. 
So, in spite of moderating its anthropocentric char-
acter on the basis of enlightened self-interest, this 
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conservationist ethic oniy differs in shade from the 
free-for-all approach of the ruthless developer. 
Many environmentalists would therefore refuse to 
accept conservationism as an adequate ethical 
basis from which to address environmental prob-
lems, in particular when it comes to wilderness 
areas. 
Wilderness Preservation 
The ethical position of wilderness preservation is 
neatly captured when one contrasts the etymology 
of the word 'conservation' with that of 'preserva-
tion'(Fox 1995:155). Both of these words derive in 
part from the Latin servus, which means slave. Pre 
carries the meaning of 'before' in Latin, while con 
means 'together' or 'with'. Conservation therefore 
has the implication of 'together with a slave', 
while preserve has the meaning of 'before slav-
ery', which in turn carries the suggestion of pre-
venting something from becoming a slave. In prac-
tical terms, preservationism stresses the instrumen-
tal values that can be enjoyed by humans if they 
allow presently existing members or aspects of the 
non-human world to follow their own characteris-
tic patterns of existence (Fox, 1995:154). 
This position is not non-anthropocentric because 
the basis and objective of leaving certain aspects of 
the non-human world untouched is still the instru-
mental: the use/value that humans can gain. 
Commentators differ on the number of arguments 
that can be formulated for the preservation of the 
non-human world, but the following captures most 
of them (Fox, 155-161): 
* The life support system argument: the non-
human world serves as a source of different kinds 
of free goods and services that are essential to our 
healthy physical survival and development. At the 
same time it serves as a natural sink for the absorp-
tion of the waste that we generate. 
* The early warning system argument is closely 
related. It emphasises that the non-human world 
serves as a source of information about deteriora-
tion in the quality or quantity of the free goods and 
services that are provided by our life support sys-
tem. In this regard, Fox (1995:158) also uses the 
analogy of an instrument panel in a space ship with 
indicator lights and gauges to monitor the 'vital 
signs' of the spaceship. This argument then 
requires of us not to damage the instrument panel 
linked to our life support system - acknowledging 
that it is only humans for whom this 'instrument 
panel' exists. 
* According to the silo argument the non-human 
world serves as a stockpile of genetic diversity for 
agricultural, medical and other purposes. In an era 
in which we make more and more use of geneti-
cally engineered seeds which are also genetically 
reduced in many aspects, it is important to have 
stockpiles of genetic diversity at hand to replenish 
the gen0tic lines of key food crops. 
* The laboratory argument appeals to the view 
that the non-human world serves as a resource for 
scientific study. By studying untouched nature we 
can gain knowledge about ourselves, but also 
about ecological systems and evolutionary 
processes that can enable us to better understand 
life in general, as well as how to maintain and 
repair it, if necessary. 
* According to the gymnasium argument the non-
human world serves as a space for recreation, and 
as a challenge against which we can measure our-
selves. Similarly the non-human world can serve 
as a source of aesthetic pleasure or spiritual inspi-
ration: the art gallery argument and the cathedral 
argument respectively. The argument here is that 
we should keep the quality of these 'services' of 
nature intact. 
* Within this context, there is also much support 
for the monument argument in which the non-
human world serves as a source of symbolic 
instruction. People may differ about the contents 
of these symbols, but they can include reminders 
of human freedom: unmanaged places are often 
seen as setting a standard of freedom and 
autonomous behaviour. Unmanaged ecosystems 
are also frequently seen as models of efficiency: 
they show us that nothing is wasted in nature, work 
as models of co-operation and harmony; or illus-
trate how vastly different kinds of entities can 
work together for mutual advantage. 
* The psychogenetic argument also emphasises the 
therapeutic function of untouched nature or 
wilderness areas. Sessions (1989), for example, 
emphasises the importance of bonding with wild or 
unmanaged places in order to maintain psycholog-
ical health. He also speaks of the importance of 
unmanaged places as refuge from heavily managed 
aspects of existence. 
The ethical stance of preservationism stands in 
sharp contrast to that of conservationism and the 
more radical position of the ruthless developer. An 
illustration of this can be found in the life of John 
Muir, the founder of the Sierra Club in 1892, who 
campaigned tirelessly for legislation to protect the 
wild areas of the American West from human 
intervention (Norton, 1994:17-38). Branded by 
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many as a romantic and a mystic who has turned 
his back on the dirty cities, Muir espoused a phi-
losophy of wilderness preservation based on what 
he, like Thoreau, sensed as a divine harmony in 
nature and a freedom not possible in the artificial 
constraints of civilisation (Barbour, 1980:27). For 
him, untouched wilderness was a refuge and a 
source of serenity in a decadent urban society 
(Barbour, 1980:21). 
Many environmentalists have a high appreciation 
for the ethical position of preservationism, but find 
it inadequate to grant only a nominal intrinsic 
value to the non-human world. This criticism is 
found in the positions of both extensionism and 
ecological sensibility. The criticism put forward by 
radical environmental ethics is that preservation-
ists seriously neglect the political forces and power 
relations that put wilderness areas under threat or 
make their preservation possible. These points will 
be taken up next. 
Ethical Extensionism 
From a conventional point of view, ethics is a 
domain that is reserved for humans. It is argued 
that only humans can make distinctions between 
what is morally acceptable or unacceptable and act 
accordingly and therefore be held responsible for 
their actions. In this sense of the word, ethics is 
indeed only a human concern, but it does not fol-
low that humans are the only entities in the world 
which are morally considerable. If moral consider-
ability were restricted to humans the non-human 
world would have value only in instrumentalist 
terms. 
Many environmentalists reject this restriction and 
argue for an extension of the boundaries of our 
moral concern to include at least some animals. 
Following the lead of Jeremy Bentham, environ-
mentalists of this persuasion argue that the validi-
ty of some of the criteria used to confer exclusive 
intrinsic value on humans, e.g. a special relation-
ship with God, the possession of a soul, rationali-
ty, self-awareness, free will, the capacity for sym-
bolic communication or to enter into reciprocal 
relationships entailing duties and obligations, or 
the capacity to project a future, can be questioned 
(Fox, 1995:149-150,162). If these criteria were 
applied strictly in order to exclude all animals, we 
might fmd that many humans would also be 
excluded from the domain of moral considerabili-
ty (e.g. primitive peoples, heathens, infants, the 
senile, and the comatose). 
If the arguments of anthropocentrism would be fol-
lowed consistently, then individuals in the cate-
gories just mentioned and thus falling outside of 
the sphere of moral considerability will have no 
intrinsic value, and accordingly, only instrumental 
value. Those with intrinsic value would then pos-
sess the moral right to use those without intrinsic 
value in any way they see fit, e.g. throw the hea-
thens to the lions for pleasure, or use primitive 
people as slaves. The logic of anthropocentrism 
can thus be shown to have untenable conse-
quences, forcing us to lower the entry standards for 
admission into the realm of moral consideration to 
include all humans (Fox, 1995:163). But if this is 
done, we will find that certain animals have also 
entered the sphere of moral considerability. 
But where should the line be drawn? Again fol-
lowing Bentham, some advocates of extensionism 
argue that the criterion should be sentience, that is, 
the capacity for sense perception, or, the capacity 
to feel or perceive. If an entity is sentient, it has 
interests: it seeks pleasurable states of being and 
seeks to avoid pain. Since pleasure is pleasure and 
pain is pain regardless of the species to which they 
attach, it is arguably arbitrary to respect human 
interests simply because it is humans who are the 
bearers of these interests. If an entity is not sen-
tient it is incapable of having any interests of its 
own, and is arguably owed no moral consideration 
(Fox, 1995:163-164). The main ethical task we are 
faced with in terms of this argument, then, is to 
ascertain if a being is capable of suffering or not 
(Fox, 1995:164). 
A serious problem arises for ethical extensionism 
at this point however, since the application of the 
utilitarian calculus of Bentham can be interpreted 
in two opposing ways, the one making nonsense of 
any serious moral consideration of animals. Fox 
(1995:164-165) points out, however, that exten-
sionism should not be read as an argument for the 
maximisation of pleasure for sentient beings, but 
rather as an argument for the reduction of pain we 
inflict upon non-human animals. This is made 
clear in the work of the two well-known exponents 
of this extensionist position, animal liberationist 
Peter Singer and animal rights advocate Tom 
Regan. 
Singer's animal liberation perspective is a plea for 
the moral consideration of all sentient entities 
(Singer, 1975). He suggests that a broad class of 
non-human animals, mammals, birds, fishes and 
reptiles, should be included in the sphere of moral 
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considerability. He is not so sure whether insects 
can suffer pain or not. His main point, however, is 
that there is no reason to ignore suffering when it 
occurs. His argument therefore goes against eating 
from the realm of that which suffer from it, and 
also against experimentation with live animals 
(vivisection), factory farming, killing for fur and 
killing for sport (Singer, 1993:54, 55, 58). 
Regan (1983) is much more restrictive, since he 
links the possession of rights to the subject of a life 
criterion. He argues that anything that is the sub-
ject of a life has rights that are to be respected. This 
criterion can only be satisfied by entities that have 
beliefs and desires, perception, memory and a 
sense of the future, including their own future, and 
an emotional life. He is therefore referring to enti-
ties with a psychological identity over time, and as 
he sees it, mentally normal mammals of a year or 
more old satisfy this criterion. On the basis of this, 
Regan calls for the total abolition of the use of ani-
mals in science, the total dissolution of commer-
cial animal agriculture and the total elimination of 
commercial sport hunting and trapping. 
Both of these two writers try to expand our moral 
horizons so that practices that were previously 
seen as natural and inevitable are now taken as 
intolerable. According to Singer, animal slavery 
should join human slavery in the graveyard of the 
past. Both of these writers are trying to overcome 
speciesism, that is, a bias towards our own species. 
They urge recogrLition of our attitudes to non-
human animals as prejudicial and no less objec-
tionable than racism or sexism. Singer and Regan 
argue that sentient non-human arLimals should not 
be treated as utilities and we should question and 
resist the entire system of treating them as mere 
resources They both appeal for more than just a 
change in our attitudes; they argue for an incisive 
change in conduct, a change in our lives (Singer, 
1993:51-52, 56-58; Regan, 1995:79). 
From an anthropocentric point of view, these argu-
ments and their implications are very hard to swal-
low. One of the problems anthropocentrists would 
have with this approach, is that sentient beings are 
allocated the same rights as humans, and that, for 
example, killing a fish therefore has the same 
moral status as murdering a person. Another con-
tention would be that concepts such as rights, 
interests, and even pain are concepts that are at 
home within a human world, and that it is impos-
sible to extend them legitimately to non-human 
sentient entities. So, praiseworthy as the require-
ment of more altruism from humankind towards 
animals might be for anthropocentrist environmen-
talists, the grounds for such an appeal seems to be 
philosophically unsupportable. 
There are other environmentalists though, who 
would reject extensionism for its anthropocentric 
leanings on the one hand, and for its ecological 
naivety on the other hand - particularly in so far as 
it concentrates on the well-being of individual non-
human sentient beings. From an ecological sensi-
bility it seems as if sentience cannot be the only 
criterion for moral considerability; there are other, 
more ecologically informed considerations to be 
accounted for as well. Part of this is that individual 
non-human sentient beings are sometimes less 
morally considerable than species or ecosystems. 
These perspectives are discussed in the next sec-
tion. 
Ecological Sensibility 
Environmental ethics based on an ecological sen-
sibility incorporates a wide variety of positions, 
but they are urLited in their rejection of instrumen-
tal value theory. Arguing from a non-anthropocen-
tric position, ecologically based environinental 
ethics would contend that we need a different, a 
new, environmental, ethics, not one based on a 
mere extension of already existing human values. 
In fact, many environmental philosophers from 
this persuasion would say that an anthropocentric 
environmental ethics is an oxymoron and that it 
cannot be taken seriously as an environmental 
ethics. 
One of the many ways to argue against anthro-
pocentric and extensiorList positions, is to point out 
that sentience (awareness) is too restrictive a cate-
gory to take as basis for the interests of non-human 
entities. The point is rather that every living thing 
has an interest in its own survival, maintairLing its 
life and well-being, irrespective of its being aware 
of it or not. All living things also have an interest 
to flourish, to be what they are as living entities 
and to develop their own biological powers fully 
(Taylor, 1995:126). This can be deduced from the 
fact that all living things seek to realise certain 
states of being and avoid other states of being 
(again: regardless of being aware of it or not). This 
can be interpreted as seeking to realise a good of 
their own. This means that living entities are not 
primarily means to ends external to themselves but 
are ends in themselves. They therefore have intrin-
sic value. Accordingly, all living things deserve 
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moral respect (Fox, 1995:166, 172, 174; Taylor, 
1995:127). 
According to this argument, the mere fact of being 
alive entails that an entity has interests, and as such 
these interests should be morally respected. This of 
course expands the sphere of moral considerability 
to include trees and plants, besides non-human ani-
mals. Paul Taylor, one of the prominent exponents 
of this bio-centric position", uses these tenets to 
reject the notion of human superiority and argue 
that the inherent worth of a human being is not 
higher than that of a non-human animal. From a 
moral point of view, he claims, we are all akin, as 
fellow members of the earth's community of life. 
Taylor (1995:131, 138) calls this species impartial-
ity: all species have the same inherent worth and 
no species is higher or lower than another. To 
acknowledge this and to act accordingly is what he 
conceives of as respect for nature. Respect for 
nature, he argues, is made possible by a denial of 
human superiority. 
Two possible criticisms of this position, among 
many, are that it focuses on individual organisms 
only and as such is still too narrow to be an ade-
quate environmental ethics. What is neglected in 
Taylor's biocentrism are entities larger than indi-
viduals, as well as the relationships and interac-
tions that make individual life possible in the first 
place. This would include species and ecosystems, 
as well as the inorganic, non-living components of 
it, like land, water, air and minerals. The most 
widely known articulation of such a (holistic) 
ecosystem ethics can be found in the work of Aldo 
Leopold (1991, [1949]), as well as in that of Baird 
Callicott ( 1987; 1989) who is the main interpreter 
of Leopold. Another prominent exponent is 
Holmes Rolston III (1988) who expands the sphere 
of moral considerability beyond species and 
ecosystems to include earth systems (e.g. the 
weather, water cycles and carbon cycles). James 
Lovelock (1979) went one step further by suggest-
ing that the earth as a whole is an integrated living 
being, named Gaia; and that she too may have 
interests and thus is morally considerable 
(Callicott, 1995:681). Alan Drengson arrived at 
the same conclusion, using the image of the planet 
as a person". 
The ethics informed by an ecological sensibility, 
however, is captured in arguably one of the most 
quoted lines of Leopold's A Sand County Almanac 
(1991:262) where he states: "A thing is right when 
it tends to preserve the integrity, stability and beau-
ty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it 
tends otherwise" .12 The term 'biotic community' 
here is revealing, because it expands ethical 
boundaries beyond the scope of humans alone. In 
fact, Leopold argues that ethics not only has to do 
with our relationship to other individual humans, 
or to communities of humans. Our notion of com-
munity should be expanded to include soils, 
waters, plants, and animals or collectively: the land 
(Leopold, 1991:239). This Land Ethic acknowl-
edges that our instincts will prompt us to compete 
for a place in the biotic community but, at the same 
time, that reason requires us to co-operate. The 
Land Ethic therefore changes the role of humans 
from conquerors to ordinary members and citizens 
of the land-community. It implies a respect for our 
fellow-members within the biotic community, but 
also respect for the community itself (Leopold, 
1991:240). 
When this ethic is translated into practical policy 
and management terms, ecological realities such as 
dynamic interaction, complexity, hierarchies, and 
the flow of energy and information are c0nsidered. 
These factors, functioning together, contribute to 
the health" of the biotic community. Anything that 
will compromise this is considered to be morally 
unsupportable and rejected or resisted. According 
to Callicott, this position was taken up by Leopold 
in order to protect the land from the onslaughts of 
mechanised man (1995:161). 
A problem that many philosophers have with 
ecosystem ethics (and also with ecosphere ethics 
such as that formulated by James Lovelock), is the 
suggestion that it is ethically permissible to sacri-
fice individual entities for the good of the whole. 
Consequently, this approach has been branded as 
dangerous nonsense or even as environmental fas-
cism. Fox (1995:177-178) however argues that this 
is a misunderstanding of ecosystem or ecosphere 
ethics. Ecosystem ethics tries to show that not only 
individual organisms are worthy of moral consid-
eration in and of themselves, but also larger organ-
isational units such as ecological and earth sys-
tems. These should be seen as enabling spaces in 
which individual organisms are free to follow their 
diverse ways of life and their evolutionary paths. 
When they step outside of the bounds of the 
ecosystem, the conditions sustaining their ways of 
life and their evolutionary paths falls away. So the 
accusation of fascism is facile as individual organ-
isms are not downtrodden as members of an 
ecosystem but instead function as members of a 
community of life. As Fox summarises it: no enti-
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ty is above ecology (Fox, 1995:179). 
Another criticism that is often raised against 
ecosystem ethics in its variety of forms, is that it 
lacks a strong social theory and critique and, 
because of the emphasis placed on the ecological 
context and dimensions of environmental prob-
lems, the humr.n origin of these problems are 
neglected. These origins can be identified and 
overcome, it is argued, if we concentrate on the 
notions of identity and self-realisation that inform 
our choices and actions, investigate the fundamen-
tal thought patterns underlying our strategies of 
decision-making and policy formulation and scru-
tinise the alienating power relations embedded in 
the structures and institutions of our global eco-
nomic system. The broad environmental ethics 
position, within which these points are articulated, 
is that of radical environmentalism. 
Radical Environmental Ethics 
Like the previous position, radical environmental 
ethics encompasses a number of different posi-
tions; the most prominent of which are deep ecol-
ogy, ecoferninism, social ecology and bioregional-
ism. What they all have in common is a politics of 
transformation. Although these positions may dif-
fer on what is to be transformed, they all agree that 
transformation should address the root causes of 
our environmental problems, and be incisive, 
definitive and fundamental. 
Deep ecology argues that the narrow, egotistic and 
individualistic notion of self-realisation should be 
overcome before we could hope to resolve envi-
ronmental problems. Deep ecology rejects the 
social atomism, materialism, and consumerism 
prevalent in modern society as a basis for self-real-
isation, and opts instead for a spiritual notion of 
self-realisation, which entails a broadening of the 
self through a strong identification with the whole 
of the universe. Deep ecology assumes an egalitar-
ian position in which everything everything in the 
universe is fundamentally one and therefore is 
equally valuable as part of the whole. 
Identification is therefore the strategy through 
which the intrinsic value of nature is unlocked, but 
also accepted. In practical terms, this entails an 
intuitive experience of the harmony and wholeness 
of nature. This intuitive and immediate identifica-
tion with nature, inspired by phenomenology, 
Vedantic Hinduism, the science of ecology and the 
philosophy of Spinoza, moves us beyond class, 
gender and species divisions in order to be in full 
harmony with nature (Naess, 1979; 1989). The 
practical implications of deep ecology have been 
captured in terms of an ethical platform compris-
ing eight principles, which each individual can 
realise in her own particular situation (Devall & 
Sessions, 1985). In these principles the supreme 
values of abundance and biodiversity are empha-
sised, as well as a reduction of the human popula-
tion, and a radical change in our consumption pat-
terns. With its motto 'simple in means, rich in 
ends', deep ecology challenges us to tread lighter 
on the earth and to explore alternative notions of 
well-being. 
Similarly, ecofeminism focuses on the dualist and 
hierarchical thought patterns of patriarchy that 
simultaneously inform the domination of women 
and the domination of nature. 14 The main focus of 
ecoferninist thinking and contribution to environ-
mental ethics is in tracing, describing and cri-
tiquing the trajectory of these thought patterns 
through history; the manner in which they have 
been institutionalised, consolidated and perpetuat-
ed in contemporary society; the domination and 
the exploitation following from this in practice; 
and ways to deconstruct and move beyond these 
patterns. In addition to incisive critiques of the 
identification of women and nature in the history 
of patriarchy ecoferninists have also generated a 
substantive body of writing devoted not only to 
alternative ways in which the female and/or femi-
nine self can be re-conceptualised, but also to ways 
in which this reconstruction of the self can help us 
to forge ecological sensibilities that can serve as a 
basis to overcome our current environmental prob-
lems. In some instances this reconstruction has led 
to a disappointing inversion of patriarchy, leaving 
us with an essentialism and a reductionism in 
which women are seen as occupying a privileged 
position vis-a-vis nature. Accordingly certain 
'essentially' feminine traits or values are isolated 
as the sole basis for an answer to our environmen-
tal problems. In other more productive instances 
though, ecoferninism has led to radical re-concep-
tualisations of male-female, human-nature and 
human-machine relationship. 
The social ecology of Murray Bookchin (1980) 
and his followers also focuses on the reality of 
domination in contemporary society, but instead of 
linking its driving force to patriarchy, it rather 
identifies hierarchical thinking in general as the 
source of our societal as well as our environmental 
problems. Social ecology further insists that there 
is no such thing as a purely natural environment, 
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because humans have already remade the natural 
world. The challenge is therefore to get this 
process under socially progressive and politically 
inclusive control (Weston, 1996:153). In order to 
achieve this, social ecology argues that hierarchies 
should be overcome since they entail systems of 
obedience and command that manifest themselves 
in cultural, traditional or psychological terms, as 
well as in the domination of nature. As such, hier-
archies are internalised states of consciousness or 
social conditions that result in situations where 
some people are leading lives of toil, guilt or sac-
rifice while others enjoy lives of pleasure and sat-
isfaction. Hierarchical structures and practices, but 
also hierarchical states of mind, should therefore 
be replaced by the opposite. In practical terms this 
means that small-scale, self-sufficient, self-gov-
erning communities with fully participatory demo-
cratic structures and institutions should replace the 
existing massive-scale economic and political 
structures of contemporary society. Bookchin 
(1989) therefore pleads for an organic vision of 
society as well as for libertarian anarchism, which 
he gives a highly positive meaning. His argument 
is that humans will only be able to live in harmony 
with nature and ecological systems if they adopt 
and engage in fully conscious, self-determining 
activity: the primary social and ethical value. 
In practical terms this principle of fully conscious, 
self-determining activity translates into decen-
tralised and diversified decision-making mecha-
nisms where the people most affected can partici-
pate directly. Bookchin argues that this will enable 
communities to cater for the needs and goals of all 
its members, and at the same time create the space 
for co-operation. This will also create diversified, 
balanced and harmonious communities that 
approximate ecosystems. The texture of social 
ecology, however, only emerges fully when it is 
understood as a plea to first address social prob-
lems before we address ecological problems: peo-
ple first, not earth first. 
Bioregionalism" also calls for small-scale, self-
sufficient and self-governing communities, but the 
focus here falls on remembering and learning how 
to live in place in a manner that is sustainable over 
time. As we are alienated from sustainable 
lifestyles and confronted with disrupted ecosys-
tems we have to learn again from the natives who 
have lived on the land, how to re-inhabit" it and 
live within its limits. We have to relocate our-
selves by adapting our technologies and lifestyles 
to the land and learning to appreciate its particular 
gifts. In practical terms, this calls for a rejection of 
capitalism, destructive technology, industrialisa-
tion, international trade and consumerism, and an 
acceptance of communalism, appropriate scale, 
participatory decision-making and subsistence liv-
ing, including recycling and permaculture. Taking 
ecological relationships that are web-like rather 
than hierp·chical as point of d";:>arture, bioregion-
alism furthermore encourages social and biologi-
cal diversity since it ensures social and ecological 
sustainability. It also emphasises poetic living, 
which is associated with inspirational experience. 
Bioregional living is therefore mystical, visionary 
and spiritual in character; it calls for a literary, 
poetic mode of expression. 
TOWARDS AN EVALUATION OF DIVERSITY 
IN ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 
From the previous section it is evident that the past 
three decades of environmental ethics did not pro-
duce a value theory that is profound enough to sup-
port the practical task of the conservation of life on 
earth (Rolston, 1991:92). It also does not seem 
likely that such a theory will be developed within 
the near future - at least not in the format of a com-
plete, unified, and coherent theoretical doctrine, 
uniting all environmentalists under one umbrella". 
The existing div~rsity of value theories means that 
environmental ethics has no shared vision, no uni-
fied voice and no common language to communi-
cate effectively with the public, environmentalists 
or decision-makers and policy formulators 
(Norton, 1994:9). 
Environmental ethics is furthermore characterised 
by a stark dichotomy between anthropocentric and 
ecocentric value theories with a third split evident 
in the number of radical, transformational posi-
tions questioning the sense of making the anthro-
pocentric-ecocentric division at all (Weston, 
1991). The disturbing fact about this three-way 
division is that the debates between the proponents 
of the respective theoretical positions are highly 
confrontational and adversarial, and also inconclu-
sive, since they quickly degenerate into ideological 
stalemates. To a large extent their arguments "ric-
ochet back and forth between ... apparently exclu-
sive world views and sets of value assumptions" 
(Norton, 1994:9). 
Anthropocentric environmental ethics, for 
instance, rejects the idea of animal rights, and the 
notion of the inherent value of nature. Since 
human subjects do all possible valuing, any non-
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anthropocentric environmental ethics would be an 
oxymoron (Callicott, 1995:676). Non-anthro-
pocentrists, however, claim that no human-centred 
ethics can ever adequately consider nature in its 
own terms and that anthropocentrism will always 
fall into the trap of instrumental value theory, 
achieving nothing more than a 'management 
etrics' for the use of the environment (Regan, 
1981). Similarly, where proponents of deep ecolo-
gy will claim that wilderness is the only real world 
(Devall, 1987), social ecologists will claim that a 
purely natural environment is nothing but a roman-
tic myth. Radical approaches also tend to dismiss 
all non-radical positions in environmental ethics 
since the latter adopt reformist positions that at the 
most only address the symptoms of our environ-
mental problems and not root causes. Deep ecolo-
gy, on the other hand, is also rejected because of its 
crude eco-brutalism (Bookchin, 1987) and sto-
icism (Cheney, 1989), while notions of biocentric 
egalitarianism has been branded as 'dangerous 
nonsense'. From another angle, animal rights 
advocate, Regan has characterised Leopold's Land 
Ethic as 'environmental fascism' because the latter 
believes that the individual (animal) can be sacri-
ficed for the sake of the whole of the land commu-
nity. Deep ecologist Warwick Fox (1989) has 
rejected ecofeminism as too self-serving, simplis-
tic and facile to be taken seriously as a remedy for 
environmental problems (Callicott, 1995:683). 
Since Leopold endorsed hunting, historically a 
predominantly male activity, Marti Kheel (1990) 
castigates his Land Ethic as epitomising male bias 
(Callicott, 1995:683). Feminism in turn criticises 
deep ecology since its notion of self-realisation 
through identification with the whole of nature 
moves us beyond race, class and gender, rendering 
obsolete the widely differentiated experiences of 
women as a dominated and exploited 'other'. 
The fierce in-fighting between the different posi-
tions within environmental ethics can partly be 
explained by the fact that many of these positions 
are characterised by ethical monism: the adoption 
of a single principle or a set of closely related prin-
ciples on the basis of which a comprehensive ethi-
cal theory is built18• The philosophical advantages 
of a monistic approach include that of logical con-
sistency and internal coherence, while its practical 
advantage is certainty as well as the ability to gen-
erate uniquely correct moral judgements in every 
situation. Within this kind of approach, however, 
little or no concern exists about irresolvable con-
flicts between competing and equally worthy 
moral claims (Norton, 1996:105). It enables its 
exponents to dogmatically state what is right in its 
own ethics, and what is wrong with all other 
approaches. Ethical monism in environmental 
ethics is highly problematic when it comes to the 
formulation of practical policy proposals. The pro-
posals of a monistic position are theoretically 
coherent and internally consistent but, being single 
factor solutions, unable to address the complexity 
of the problem to which they are applied. 
Closely linked to the latter problem is that of meta-
physical bias (Warren & Cheney, 1993). In one 
sense this entails an adoption of questionable 
metaphysical commitments, some of which are 
truly mystical in the sense of going beyond empir-
ical data (Norton, 1984). The rights of nature, the 
liberation of animals, the intrinsic value of nature, 
seeing the land as a community, referring to the 
planet as a person, or identifying oneself with the 
whole of nature could all be quoted as examples in 
this regard, and amongst policy formulators and 
environmental decision-makers legitimate ques-
tions arise as to the need to take such notions into 
account when conceptualising our environmental 
problems, or formulating and justifying our 
responses. 
In a_nother sense, the metaphysical bias of many 
positions within environmental ethics often leads 
to an over-emphasis on theory and an under-
emphasis of practice. Philosophers working in the 
field of environmental ethics have tended, with 
some exceptions, to devote their energy to highly 
technical, theoretical, internal debates about the 
grounds and the meaning of our environmental 
concern without giving much attention to making 
their insights accessible and useful to environmen-
tal policy formulators at least. It is no wonder then 
that many environmental practitioners are scepti-
cal about the use value of environmental ethics in 
the real world of environmental policy and man-
agement. Their insights might eventually trickle 
down to us, the sceptic practitioner will say, but 
this is still a long way off in the future. 
So, how do I as a philosopher working in the field 
of environmental ethics respond to this scenario? 
Is it reason enough for despair? Should I pack up 
my books, resign my teaching job and spend the 
rest of my days on the beach or in bars playing 
pool? My answer to these questions would be no, 
and my reasons for this are inspired by a position 
in environmental ethics, as yet unmentioned, 
namely environmental pragmatism. 
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Within environmental pragmatism concrete envi-
ronmental problems are always placed within a 
particular context, and that context is then linked 
with wider contexts within which it is embedded. 
In this regard, theory only plays a secondary role: 
providing tools in order to conceptualise problems 
and formulate proposals about addressing them. 
There are no final framework or indubitable truth 
from which environmental problems could be 
approached. There are only a variety of conceptu-
al tools that we can make use of, and some of these 
may prove to be more useful than others (Parker, 
1996:21). From this point of view, environmental 
ethics can be seen as a large toolkit developed over 
the past three decades that we can use when we 
need it. Through engagement with practical prob-
lems, we can also shape new tools for this kit, 
adding to it or refining it as we go along. As such, 
environmental pragmatism opens up a valuable 
practical and historical perspective on the diversi-
ty of positions within environmental ethics. 
Environmental pragmatism would suggest that we 
place the diversity of positions within environmen-
tal ethics within a historical framework. One of the 
first things to notice from this point of view, is that 
environmental ethics is still in its originary stages 
and should be evaluated as such (Weston, 
1995:463; 1996:147). In fact the rapid emergence 
of environmental ethics in the past three decades 
could be seen as a revolutionary historical event: it 
could be seen as a paradigm shift in the Kuhnian 
sense, taking place in ethics. As such, environ-
mental ethics is a response to an experience of cri-
sis, namely the inability of conventional (ethical) 
positions to adequately conceptualise and respond 
to environmental problems as they currently face 
us. In revolutionary times like these, much intel-
lectual exploration and experimentation is to be 
expected, and this is to be welcomed. In the 
process, novel experiences are worked through, 
new ethical metaphors are coined, new principles 
are put on the table, and unexpected conclusions 
are reached as we follow the arguments where they 
lead us: into uncharted territories. So, in the origi-
nary stages of any ethics, a certain measure of 
resistance can also be expected from the more con-
ventional positions. The latter may contend that we 
do not need a new, an environmental, ethics, and 
that concepts with well-established meanings are 
positively misused within it (Weston, 1995:463). 
Another feature of an emerging ethics is that it is 
seldom established in a smooth and orderly fash-
ion. Similar to a political revolution a variety of 
different and often incompatible outlines, coupled 
with a wide range of protopractices and even social 
experiments, are tried out. Some of these will pre-
vail, and they will then rewrite the history of their 
emergence, smoothing over and even obscuring 
rival positions that were left behind (Weston, 
1995:464, 466). 
It might be too early, therefore, to expect of envi-
ronmental ethics to have reached a consensus, a 
finality and a sense of direction, that will find out-
right and general approval amongst environmen-
talists, the broad public, decision-makers and poli-
cy formulators. It might be too early to discard 
environmental ethics because it is tentative, provi-
sional, fragmented and in many instances support-
ing notions that on face value appear to be wild", 
strange, forced and truncated. The human ethics 
which recognises the rights and dignity of persons, 
and which we accept as self-evident today, went 
through the same phase about 200 years ago, and it 
only gradually evolved to become generally 
accepted and interwoven with the very fabric of 
our constantly evolving institutions, experiences 
and practices (Weston, 1995:463). 
In the light of these observations, the originary 
stages of environmental ethics should be recog-
nised as such, but also taken seriously lest we miss 
the very fertile gestation taking place. Indeed, the 
current state of affairs in environmental ethics 
should remind us of the power that we as humans 
have to shape new values, but also of the necessi-
ty to establish transformed practices, institutions 
and experiences that can nourish and sustain them 
(Weston, 1995:464). Many of the strange and wild 
ideas of environmental ethics (animal rights, the 
land as a community, the planet as a person), there-
fore, should rather be seen as genuine efforts to 
articulate new values and transform existing prac-
tices, institutions, and experiences. They do not 
fulfil a descriptive function within an already 
established framework of values and practices. 
They serve rather as rhetorical devices: open-
ended challenges to that which already exists. 
They serve to open up questions, not to settle them. 
As such, environmental ethics emerges as nothing 
but a partner in a wider and ongoing, creative and 
prospective human endeavour (Weston, 1955:465). 
On one level it is part of our hesitant, incomplete 
efforts to resolve real life challenges. On another 
level it actively participates in our contingent and 
historical efforts to sort out the meaning of our 
experience and what is happening - not only to us 
as humans, but to life on earth in general. After all, 
our concepts and our values ~·emerge in the ongo-
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ing transactions between humans and environ-
ments" (Parker, 1996:21). 
CONCLUSION 
Within the framework of a non-dogmatic, non-
metaphysical, pluralistic and pragmatic approach 
to environmental ethics I do not think we should 
settle for one conclusion only. One possibility is to 
speak with Anthony Weston (1995:466) and state 
that environmental ethics: 
might well be viewed as another kind of eth-
ical experiment or proposal; rather like, for 
example, the work of the utopian socialists. 
However unrealistic, they may nonetheless 
play a historical and transitional role: high-
lighting new possibilities, inspiring recon-
structive experiments, even perhaps eventu-
ally provoking environmental ethics equiva-
lent to Marx. 
But this may sound too tentative to be of any prac-
tical use, so here I can invoke Eugene Hargrove 
(Hargrove, 1989:8) who has observed the follow-
ing: 
Although it is commonly believed that envi-
ronmental ethics will ultimately produce a 
tight, rationally ordered set of rules, that can 
automatically be applied with great preci-
sion, I think that the likelihood that such an 
environmental ethic will ever be produced is 
zero, or very close to it. 
Hargrove does not see this as a failure but a reflec-
tion of the fact that an environmental ethics in the 
format of a system of rules is not needed .. Given 
the manner in which the human mind actually 
makes decisions this would probably not be useful 
even if it existed: 
Whatever environmental ethics in the future 
will be, it will consist of a collection of inde-
pendent ethical generalisations, norms or 
principles, that are only loosely related and 
can be used on a practical policy level to 
guide our decisions and management prac-
tices (ibid). 
Finally the issue is not only one of thinking but 
also of doing, i.e. practising environmental ethics 
as a contribution towards, and an active participant 
in, concrete and real life decision making. We con-
clude with a shift in focus, or rather a new set of 
issues and challenges. As Christopher 
Stone?(l988: 154) suggests: "the main question 
now is this: what model of decision process pro-
vides the best prospect for constructing the best 
answers reason can furnish?" 
The challenge to environmental ethics is to focus 
on contributions that can help establish practices, 
structures, institutions and spaces in which new or 
stronger environmental values can emerge, be fos-
tered and allowed to flourish. Weston (1995:466) 
refers to this as enabling environmental practice. 
The discussion of this challenge, however, lies 
beyond the scope of this paper-2°. It identifies, how-
ever, a rich area of interaction and learning in 
which environmentalists, environmental educa-
tors, philosophers and policymakers can grow and 
act together in future. 
NOTES 
1. This article is a reworked and drastically shortened 
version of parts of the paper that was delivered at the 
1999 EEASA Conference in Grahamstown under the 
title: Are we there yet? Taking stock of three decades of 
environmental ethics. The full text of that paper was 
published in Growing Together. Proceedings of the 
Annual Conference and Workshops of the 
Environmental Education Association of Southern 
Africa, 7-10 September 1999: Rhodes University, 
Grahamstown, South Africa: 50-78. 
2. The phrase "finding creativity in diversity" was used 
by Bryan Norton to make this kind of point at a CSIR 
workshop held in Stellenbosch on September 6th, 1999. 
3. See a brief history of the origins of environmental 
ethics: The Centre for Environmental Philosophy at the 
University of North Texas 
<http://www.cep.unt.edu/novice.htrnl> 
4. Exponents of deep ecology include George Sessions, 
Bill Devall, Warwick Fox and Max Oelschlaeger. 
5. Ethics and Animals which was followed by Between 
the Species. 
6. See the Twenty-Year Index (1979-1998) of 
Environmental Ethics in Volume 20, 449-479, also 
available at 
<http://www.cep.unt.edu/index17.html>. 
7. These authors have followed a process philosophy 
approach in accordance with the philosophy of organ-
ism of Alfred North Whitehead. 
8. Norton also published Towards Unity amongst 
Environmentalists in 1991 in which the position of 
environmental pragmatism is made accessible to deci-
sion-makers and policy formulators. 
9. William Baxter (1995:382-383) captures this version 
of anthropocentrism well in his plea for optimal pollu-
tion levels. Rejecting the idea of a standard norm for 
clean air and water, he suggests that we rather opt for 
optimum levels of pollution. He is also (in)famous for 
the statement that "Damage to penguins, or sugar pines, 
or geological marvels is, without more, simply irrele-
vant. Penguins are (only?) important because people 
enjoy seeing them walk about rocks" (1995:382). 
10. Others include Albert Schweitzer (1969) and 
82 Southern African Journal of Environmental Education, no. 19, 1999 
Kenneth Goodpaster (1978). 
11. Drengson draws here on Roszak's book 
Planet/Person (1978). A person-planetary paradigm, 
Drengson argues, will enable us to approach the earth as 
a whole with respectfulness and humility. 
12. James Heffernan felt that this principle reflected too 
much anthropocentric bias, so he reformulated it in 
more ecological terms as follows: A thing is right when 
it tends to preserve the characteristic diversity and sta-
bility of an ecosystem (or biosphere). It is wrong when 
it tends otherwise (Fox, 1995:177). 
13. The exact meaning of the term 'health' is hotly 
debated amongst ecologists and environmentalists. One 
interpretation takes it as 'stability'. Another rather 
understands it as 'resilience'. 
14. Marincowitz (1998) for a thorough introduction to 
the different positions within ecofeminisrn. 
15. See the work of Berg & Dasmann (1978) and 
Kirkpatrick Sale (1985). 
16. On re-inhabitation see Peter Berg (1991) and Dave 
Foreman (1987). 
17. This is the ideal that Baird Callicott (1990) has set 
for environmental ethics. Anthony Weston (1995:466) 
and Bryan Norton (1996:105), amongst others, are 
highly critical of this effort to create a 'univocal' envi-
ronmental ethics. 
18 , See the articles by Wenz (1993) and Stone (1988) 
on this topic. 
19. Rolston's book Philosophy Gone Wild also alludes 
to this meaning of the word, and not only to an ethics 
emphasising the value of wilderness. See also Weston 
(1996: 143). 
20. In his notion of 'contextual management', also 
referred to as 'adaptive management', Bryan Norton 
(1984; 1994; 1996) has already made very valuable 
contributions in this regard. 
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